“Pricing game” for tacit collusion and passive investment

研究成果: Conference article


This paper aimed to figure out the structural factors of tacit collusion from the perspective of the oligopolistic market. A two-step approach is adopted to analyse this phenomenon. As pricing mechanisms shift from traditional method to computational algorithm, herein termed the “pricing game”, new forms of collusion are expected to emerge. First, game theory is applied toward an understanding of this unspoken collusion, which involves interaction between different parties. A potential new form of collusion is identified as having been created by information signals in the price networks. Second, firms are owned by overlapping sets of investors (passive investors), and their incentives to compete are thereby reduced. Investors are rapidly shifting their investment allocations from active to passive management (ETF; Exchange Traded Funds), in response to the complexity of asset management and the excess liquidity from central banks around the industrial world. This trend has accelerated during the last decade. A potential solution for this situation may be found in family ownership, as a countervailing power for healthy competition.

ジャーナルCEUR Workshop Proceedings
出版物ステータスPublished - 1 1 2019
イベント5th Collaborative European Research Conference, CERC 2019 - Darmstadt, Germany
継続期間: 29 3 201930 3 2019

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